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Abstract
"Likert scales" are the most standard and widespread instrument in
survey research when measuring public opinion on political and economic
issues. In this simple approach, respondents are given the opportunity to
voice their agreement or disagreement on a set of issues by placing their
attitudes on a scale that runs from strongly disagreeto strongly agree.
One assumption commonly made by social scientists using such scales is
that they provide faithful - if noisy - measures of respondentsviews. We
challenge this assumption, highlighting several reasons why respondents
may be expected to sysmatically exaggerate their views in political sur-
veys using Likert scales. We propose a simple decision-theoretic model
of survey answers to discuss whether Quadratic Voting might overcome
these pathologies. We provide conditions under which one might expect
Quadratic Voting to outperform Likert scales.
1 Introduction
At its heart, survey research tries to understand what individuals think and
know about the world. Policymakers and social scientists conduct polls because
they want to know what the public thinks on some specic issues. This
information can be used by policymakers to inform their decisions on specic
policies. It is also used normatively by political scientists as a type of benchmark
to judge the politics in a given policy arena. Perhaps the clearest example
of this latter use of surveys comes from the politics of gun regulation in the
United States. In the past three decades, an average of 2/3 of American citizens
surveyed have indicated support for making gun control regulations stricter.
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Despite this consensus, Congress has not been able to regulate gun ownership.
Some political scientists use this gap to conclude that interest groups, such as
the National Rie Association, must be capturingthe policy process to impose
their preferences on democratic majorities.1
An implicit assumption in both approaches is that surveys successfully mea-
sure political or economic preferences, and in particular can successfully measure
their intensity. In the 1930s, Likert developed a simple approach to measure
popular attitudes on a multidimensional scale in which respondents could voice
their agreement or disagreement on a set of questions. Respondents were asked
to place their attitudes on a scale that runs from strongly disagreeto strongly
agree.As surveys have become cheaper and easier to conduct, on-line survey
research has proliferated, but survey methods for measuring policy preferences
have changed little in the past century. Most survey researchers still use some
versions of a Likert scale; yet, there are many known problems with this ap-
proach.
In this article, we propose a simple and parsimonious decision-theoretic
model of survey answers, in order to highlight some of the pathologies of these
scales. We make the assumption that even if respondents are taking the task
to answer surveys seriously and are intrinsically motivated to report their true
views - we call this the "sincerity motive" - they are simultaneously pursuing
other objectives when answering surveys. Indeed, we argue that they might want
to inuence policy, to avoid politically incorrect answers, to signal a partisan
identity, etc. Regarding this last motive, Berdejo and Chen (2017) interestingly
show that just before U.S. Presidential elections, judges on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals double the rate at which they dissent and vote along partisan lines. If
highly experienced professionals making common law precedent exhibit such a
strong partisan motive, there is reason to believe that lay citizens answering po-
litical surveys (a low stake decision) should also be inuenced by their partisan
identity.
Studying formally how these other motives might interfere with the sincerity
motive, we show that there is reason to expect respondents to systematically
inate their views under Likert scales, and to report to be more extreme than
they actually are. We then discuss under which conditions Quadratic Voting
(QV) is likely to perform better than Likert scales at measuring "true opinions".
This approach draws on existing research on quadratic voting (Lalley and
Weyl 2017). The QV method captures how much respondents care about a
given set of issues, by asking them to buyvotes in favor or against each one
1 In recent work on regulatory capture, Carpenter (2014) similarly relies on public opinion
polls to measure the inuence of interest groups. He argues that political scientists rst need
to measure majority preferences and then look for evidence of interest groups moving policy
away from these views to detect policy capture. This approach to survey data has been used
in diverse areas, such as environmental, worker safety, food and drug, and labor regulations
(also see Gilens 2012 on the gap between public opinion polls and legislative action).
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of these issues. Because the price for each vote is quadratic, it becomes increas-
ingly costly to acquire additional votes to express support or opposition to the
same issue. As shown formally by Lalley and Weyl (2017), the quadratic price
incentivizes individuals to more accurately report not only the direction of their
preferences (in favor or against), but also the intensity of their preferences with
regards to a given issue, relative to other issues. In this original formulation,
QV was intended as a means of arriving at e¢ cient social decisions when voting.
However, it can also be applied to survey research. In a rst exploration, Quar-
foot et al. (2017) compare QV to Likert-based survey instruments by randomly
assigning respondents to one method or the other on m-Turk. We complement
this empirical approach by proposing a decision-theoretic analysis of the perfor-
mance of QV versus Likert. We also complement Lalley and Weyl (2017), who
primarily assumed that inuencing policy is the main motivation of citizens, by
explicitly modeling other potential motives: a sincerity motive, a partisan mo-
tive, etc. We formally study how respondents solve the trade-o¤ between these
potentially conicting motives, depending on the survey instruments (Likert or
QV).
2 A decision-theoretic model of survey answers
Consider a number of policy issues, on which citizens may have any opinion
between two extreme antagonistic positions. A survey is run to evaluate where
the citizens stand on each of these issues.
Respondentsmotivation when answering surveys We assume that
an individual may have (at least) two (potentially) conicting motives when
answering the survey.
On the one hand, she derives some intrinsic utility from reporting her "true
opinion" on each issue. This might derive from some expressive benets (I am
happy to tell who I am, or what I stand for), or this might be induced by a
psychological cost of lying. We call this motive the "sincerity motive". This is
the motive generally assumed in the literature using survey data.2
On the other hand, we defend the view that she may also care about how her
answers will be read and interpreted by other people, which might conict with
this sincerity motive. This additional motivation might encompass a variety
of psychological mechanisms, depending on the context and the question. For
example, imagine that the government is considering whether a specic reform
should be adopted or not, and that a survey is conducted to measure public
support for or opposition to this reform. The respondent might be willing to
use her answers to the survey to inuence policy making. Another motivation for
the respondent might be to signal to herself, or to whoever is going to read the
survey, that she has some socially desirable traits. For example, she may want
2One assumption commonly made by social scientists using survey data is that they pro-
vide a faithful - if noisy - measure of respondents views (See for example Achen 1975 or
Ansolabehere et al 2008).
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to appear altruistic, non-racist, tolerant, etc. She might also want to signal a
group identity. For example, if she is a Republican, and she expects Republicans
to take specic positions on some issues, she may su¤er a psychological cost from
moving away from these typical "Republican positions". Whatever the source of
this motivation, because of this "signaling motive", one position is particularly
attractive to the respondent, which might be di¤erent from where she really
stands.
The utility function To capture these two motivations (sincerity and sig-
naling), we propose a simple general model describing how respondents answer
surveys.3
Assume a survey is run to measure respondentsviews on K di¤erent policy
or political issues. A position on any such issue is modeled as a real number
in the interval [ 1;+1], where the extreme positions +1 and  1 denote perfect
agreement with one of these extreme views. We assume that, on each issue
k = 1; :::;K, respondent i is characterized by two parameters also lying in the
interval [ 1;+1], her "true" opinion, denoted by xik, and the opinion she nds
the most attractive because of the signaling motive, denoted by tik. We call it
her signaling target.
We assume that the utility a respondent derives from answering the sur-
vey, denoted by Vi, depends on her answers to the survey (her reported policy
positions, bxi = (bxi1; :::; bxiK) 2 [ 1;+1]K) in the following way:
Vi(bxi) =X
k
[Fik (bxik) +Gik (bxik)] ;
where functions Fik and Gik are single-peaked, and reach their maximum inbxik = xik and bxik = tik respectively. The rst term in the utility function
captures the sincerity motive. If for a given issue only this motive were present,
the maximal utility an individual could get is by reporting her true opinion
on this issue. The second term on the right-hand side represents the signaling
motive. If only this motive were present, the maximal utility an individual
could get is by reporting her signaling target. For the time being, we make no
additional assumptions on functions Fik and Gik and on the signaling targets
ti. In what follows, we will consider in more detail two examples of particular
interest, one where the signaling motive is induced by a desire to inuence policy,
and the other where it is induced by a partisan identity.
"Survey technology" The survey technology species the set of answers
that are admissible, that is, the set of answers the respondents can choose
from. For example, under standard Likert scales, a respondent can pick any
answer on a pre-determined scale (e.g. "strongly oppose", "somewhat oppose",
"neither oppose nor support", "somewhat support", "strongly support"). Under
3Our model shares some similarities with that of Bullock et al. (2015), which studies
systematic di¤erences between Republican and Democrat voters in how they answer factual
questions about economic facts.
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Quadratic Voting, there is a maximum number of points that the respondent can
use to answer, and the marginal cost of moving away from the neutral answer
(here 0) increases linearly with the distance to this neutral answer.
Optimization problem Individuals are assumed to choose answers (bxi)
that maximize the utility function Vi, subject to the constraints on answers
imposed by the survey technology.
Equipped with this very simple model, we can predict how respondents will
answer the survey. In particular, our interest will be to discuss whether these
reported views are a good measure of the "true opinion" (xi). In the next section
we describe answers under Likert scales, and then turn to the QV technology in
the following section.
3 Properties of optimal answers under Likert
scales
We consider rst the case of Likert scales. For simplicity, we will ignore the fact
that there are in general only a discrete number of answers the respondent can
choose from ("strongly favor", "somewhat favor", etc.); we will instead assume
that she can pick any number in the [ 1;+1] interval. In that case, the set of
admissible answers is simply [ 1;+1]K and the individual solves the following
optimization program:
maxbxi2[ 1;+1]K Vi(bxi) =Xk [Fik (bxik) +Gik (bxik)] :
Denote by bxLi = (bxLi1; :::; bxLiK) the solution of this program.
Properties of the optimal responses It is straightforward to check that
the optimal answer on issue k (bxLik) lies somewhere betweenxik and tik (that
is, in the interval [xik; tik] if xik  tik and in the interval [tik; xik] otherwise).
Otherwise, the respondent could simultaneously improve on both objectives.
Where exactly she will locate between these two positions depends on the shape
of the functions Fik and Gik.
 Concave sub-utility functions: In particular, if the functions Fik and
Gik are both concave with F
0
ik(xik) = G
0
ik(tik) = 0, there is a strictly
interior solution. With Likert scales, individuals answer by compromising
between their two motives. Answers incorporate information about both
xik and tik.
 Convex sub-utility functions: By contrast, if the functions Fik and Gik
are both convex, then the objective Vi is convex in bxik and the individual
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either truthfully reports her true opinion xik on this issue, or she reports
her signaling targettik.4
Systematic misreporting One assumption commonly made by social sci-
entists using political survey data is that surveys using Likert scales provide
a faithful - if noisy - measure of respondents true views (Achen 1975, An-
solabehere et al. 2008). Our model highlights the fact that respondents may
deviate from their true views in systematic ways. To illustrate this, we docu-
ment new attitudinal patterns that are inconsistent with the dominant view of
attitudes being measured only with random error. We present electoral cycles in
indices developed by Ansolobohere et al (2006) to measure economic and moral
attitudes. We use the General Social Surveys date of interview and cluster
standard errors by year of interview. Each subsequent gure presents specica-
tions with a full set of quarter-to-elect dummy indicators omitting quarter 16
(so November-January after an election is the comparison group), and also con-
trols for seasonality (Jan-Mar, April-June, July-Sept, Oct-Dec). Fig. 1 shows
that Democrats are systematically more culturally conservative 2 quarters after
a presidential election and 2 quarters after a midterm election (May-July). Fig.
2 shows that Republicans are more culturally liberal 1 quarter after these elec-
tions. In the appendix, the corresponding patterns for economic attitudes are
less pronounced, with both groups being more economically liberal 2 quarters
after midterms. Next we analyze group cohesion as it varies over the electoral
cycle. We calculate the average standard deviation in responses to each question
for Democrats and for Republicans. Fig. 4 shows that two quarters after elec-
tions, Republicans have more within-group cohesion on cultural issues. Fig. 3
shows a similar pattern for Democrats two quarters after presidential elections.
In the appendix, the pattern for economic attitudes are less systematic, though
patterns still appear two quarters after elections (Fig. 5-8).
When political opinions are measured using Likert scales, there are a number
of issues on which some respondents are likely to systematically misreport their
true views. What can be said about the direction of this deviation? Will
individuals appear in their answers to be more or less extreme than what they
really are? In full generality, this deviation can go in any direction, depending
on the relative position of the true opinion (xik) and of the partisan target (tik).
Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that "systematic exaggeration", in the
sense of reporting more extreme answers than one would if only motivated by
the sincerity motive, is likely to occur. In the next two sections, we study two
such situations, and discuss wether quadratic voting might help alleviate this
problem.
4More specically, an individual chooses bxLik = xik if Fik (xik)   Fik (tik) > Gik (tik)  
Gik (xik) and bxLik = tik otherwise.
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4 The "policy inuence motive"
For example, if the individual wants to inuence the decisions made by the
government on issue k, the target is tik = +1 if xik > 0, and tik =  1 if xik < 0,
and there will be a strategic ination in the reported intensity. In the polar
case where this policy inuence motive is predominant, respondents will bunch
at the extreme points of the Likert scale.
Assumptions To be more specic about the context in this case, assume
that K independent binary decisions have to be made by the government, say,
implement a given reform or keep the status quo. In that case, xik 2 [ 1;+1] is
to be interpreted as the utility derived by individual i if reform k is implemented
(compared to the status quo). Assume that a survey is run to evaluate the total
utility that the implementation of each of the K reforms is likely to generate.
We assume that the signaling part of the utility function has the following
form: Gik (bxik) = xikS (bxik) where Sik (bxik) is the probability that the reform
is implemented if the individual reports bxik (with S0ik > 0). Note that in the
signaling motive, this inuence function is weighted by how much the respondent
is impacted by the reform (xik). To derive some simple closed-form solutions,
we make the following assumptions:
Fik (bxik) =  1
2
ik (xik   bxik)2 (quadratic sincerity motive),
Sik (bxik) = ik  bxik (linear policy inuence)
where parameter ik captures the marginal impact of bxik on the decision making
process, and parameter ik  0 describes the weight of the sincerity versus
signaling motive on issue k.
Optimal responses under Likert Under Likert, it is easy to check that
the optimal answers are in that case:
bxLik = sign(xik)max 1 + ikik

jxikj ; 1

; (1)
where sign(xik) = +1 if xik > 0 and sign(xik) =  1 if xik < 0. Expression
(1) shows that the optimal answer has the same sign as the true preference
(no misreporting in the direction of the preferences), but the intensity is always
exaggerated. The size of the exaggeration is increasing with the ratio ikik (the
strength of the policy inuence motive relative to the sincerity motive). When
this ratio becomes large enough, the individual will choose to locate at one of
the extremities of the scale. When such bunching occurs (in particular if only
the policy inuence motive is present), the only information that can be learnt
with the Likert technology is the direction of the preference; nothing can be
learnt about intensity. Note that this is the situation originally motivating the
use of QV in the seminal work of Lalley and Weyl (2017).
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Optimal responses under QV One solution to this problem might be
to make reporting extreme values more costly than reporting moderate values.
This is the basic idea underlying "Quadratic Voting" (QV) (See Lalley and Weyl
2017). Formally, assume that the set of feasible answers under QV is:(bxi = (bxi1; :::; bxiK) 2 [ 1;+1]K :X
k
bx2ik  B
)
;
where B 2 R+. Deriving the optimal answers under QV is more complicated
since it involves solving a constrained maximization program. The details of the
proof are relegated in a technical appendix. As one can check in the appendix,
the optimal response on issue k under QV is:
bxQVik = sign(xik)max
24 1
1 +
2i
ik

1 +
ik
ik

jxikj ; 1
35 ; (2)
where i is the Lagrange multiplier at the optimum. If
X
k
 bxLik2  B, meaning
that optimal answers under Likert are within the QV budget set, then bxQVi =bxLi and i = 0. If X
k
 bxLik2 > B, then optimal answers under QV are not
admissible under QV, and the individual has to report less extreme views.
Relative performance of Likert and QV As intuition suggests, the
relative performance of Likert vs QV depends on the relative strength of the
sincerity motive and policy inuence motive.
If the policy inuence motive is very weak compared to the sincerity motive
(i.e. ikik close to 0), Likert scales provide a good measure of preferences (see
(1)). Indeed, reported views will be close to true opinions, with little bunching
at extreme positions on the scales. In that case, QV is not needed, and will even
undermine the quality of the measure of preferences, since the binding budget
constraint will prevent some respondents to report their true preferences.
By contrast, if the policy inuence motive is strong enough, Likert will pro-
vide a poor measure of the intensity of preferences, because strategic considera-
tions will induce respondents to bunch at extreme values (see (1)). In that case,
QV might represent a substantial improvement over Likert. Indeed, by mak-
ing extreme reports more costly, it decreases the bunching at extreme positions
observed with Likert, and is thus likely to generate better quality information
about the intensity of preferences.
5 The "partisan consistency motive"
Assumptions When answering political surveys, the policy inuence mo-
tive is not the only motive that may induce respondents to distort their true
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preferences. Another interesting example is a situation where citizens have
strong partisan identities, and where even if they disagree with their preferred
partys position on a specic issue, they su¤er a psychological cost from report-
ing a divergent opinion. We will this motive the "partisan consistency motive".
In that case, their signaling target tik on an issue is the position of the party
with which they identify. Imagine a situation where party elites are very polar-
ized, and consider an individual who generally agrees with her preferred party
regarding the directionof the policy (that is, xik and tik have the same sign
on most issues), but who is generally less extreme (jxikj  jtikj on most issues).
Under Likert, such an individual, because she wants to look like a good Re-
publicanor like a good Democrat, will pick more extreme answers than she
would if she were just reporting truthfully her own opinion.
To derive some simple closed-form solutions, we study a simple example with
quadratic sub-utility functions for both the sincerity and the signaling motives.
We will assume in what follows that the utility function Vi is:
Vi(bxi) =  1
2
ik
X
k
h
(1  ik) (bxik   xik)2 + ik (bxik   tik)2i ;
with ik > 0 and ik 2 [0; 1]. Parameter ik is the importance put on issue
k when answering the survey, and parameter ik is the relative weight of the
partisan consistency motive compared to the sincerity motive for issue k.
Optimal responses under Likert Under Likert technology, it is easy to
check that the solution of the optimization program is:
bxLik = (1  ik)xik + iktik: (3)
If ik = 0 (only the sincerity motive is active), the individual has no incentive
to misreport her view, and bxLik = xik. But as soon as ik > 0, the individual
has the incentive to move away from her true opinion in the direction of the
partisan target.
Note that under Likert, how much the individual values her answer to this
question compared to other questions in the survey (parameter ik) does not
inuence her answers. Indeed, each question is treated in isolation.
Optimal responses under QV Under QV technology, we show in the
appendix that the optimal response on issue k under QV is:
bxQVik = 1
1 + 2
i
ik
[(1  ik)xik + iktik] ; (4)
where i is the Lagrange multiplier at the optimum.
Relative performance of Likert and QV Note rst that, as in the case
of the policy inuence motive, if the partisan motive is very weak compared to
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the sincerity motive (i.e. ik close to 0), Likert scales provide a good measure
of preferences (see (3)). In that case again, QV is not needed, and will even
undermine the quality of the measure of preferences, since the binding budget
constraint will prevent some respondents to report their true preferences.
Consider now cases where the partisan motive can be potentially strong.
As soon as the budget constraint is binding, compared to Likert, QV shrinks
all answers towards the neutral answer (0). Expression (4) shows that this
contraction can be heterogenous across issues: more points will be given to
issues with an higher ik, meaning that respondents will put more points on
issues that they judge as important. In that case, the relative performance of QV
vs. Likert at measuring trueopinions depends on the statistical relationship
between ik (the importance of the issue) and ik (the relative importance
of the partisan motive compared to the sincerity motive). Depending on this
relationship, either method can dominate.
 If the ik are the same for all issues for an individual, expression (4)
shows that for this individual, the optimal answers under QV are just
given, compared to Likert, by shrinkingall answers proportionally to-
wards the neutral answer (0), until one satises the budget constraint.5
If the partisan targets are more extreme than the respondentstrue views
(jtikj > jxikj), QV will move answers in the correct direction (compared
to Likert). But it is important to note that QV will not "purge" reported
answers of the partisan motive: answers will still be a convex combination
of the true opinion and the partisan target, with exactly the same relative
weights as under Likert. In that sense, QV will not perform better than
Likert.
 If high ik tend to be associated with low ik, more votes will be put
on issues with a strong sincerity motive, and QV might perform better
than Likert at measuring true opinions. There are reasons to expect
such a positive correlation between the importance of the issue and the
strength of the sincerity motive. Indeed, consider an individual who cares
strongly about some issues, and considers others as secondary or not very
important. On the former set of issues, the individual will be ready to
collect information, invest some time and e¤ort to think about the pros
and cons of various policies, and eventually form a strong, independent
opinion. For such issues, the sincerity motive is likely to be strong and
the partisan motive weak. By contrast, consider the issues in the latter
set. Such issues are issues the individual does not really care about and
has not thoughtfully reected upon. In that case, she might be happy
to use the party line as the main determinant of her answers. To make
this argument more clearly, consider the extreme case where there are two
5More specically, using condition (6) in the appendix, one can check that:
bxQVik =
s
BP
m
 bxLim2  bxLik:
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types of issues: those about which the individual cares and where the
sincerity motive is predominant, say ik = 1 and ik = ", with " << 1,
and those about which the individual does not care and where the partisan
motive is predominant, say ik = " and ik = 1   ". In that case, under
Likert, the individual will report her true opinion on the rst set of issues,
and will report her partisan target on the second set (See (3)). Under QV,
assuming that the budget constraint is su¢ ciently binding, she will put
no points on the second set of issues, and she will allocate all her points
on the issues with a strong sincerity motive. In such a situation, QV is
likely to represent a signicant improvement over Likert.
 Note last that if high ik tend to be associated with high ik, the exact
opposite argument will prevail and QV might perform worse than Likert.
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6 Technical Appendix
6.1 Optimal responses under QV: The policy inuence
case
Consider the policy inuence case, with the folowing utility function:
Vi(bxi) =X
k

 1
2
ik (bxik   xik)2 + xikikbxik :
Under QV, the individual maximizes her utility Vi subject to the budget con-
straint
X
k
bx2ik  B. Write the Lagrangian as:
L (bxi; i) =X
k

 1
2
ik (bxik   xik)2 + xikikbxik+ i
 
B  
X
k
(bxik)2! ;
where i is the Lagrange multiplier. Taking the derivatives with respect to bxik,
one can check that this rst order condition gives:
bxik =
8>>>><>>>>:
+1 if

1 + ikik

 jxikj > 1 + 2iik and xik > 0;
 1 if

1 + ikik

 jxikj > 1 + 2iik and xik < 0;
1+
ik
ik
1+
2i
ik
 xik otherwise.
If
P
k
 bxLik2  B: responses are the same as under Likert (the budget
constraint is not binding, and at the optimum the Lagrange multiplier equals
0).
If
P
k
 bxLik2 > B, then satisfying the budget constraint implies that:
X
k:xik>0
 
min
 
1 + ikik
1 + 2iik
 xik;+1
!!2
+
X
k:xik<0
 
max
 
1 + ikik
1 + 2iik
 xik; 1
!!2
= B:
(5)
Note that the left-hand side of the equality is strictly decreasing in i. It takes
the value
P
k
 bxLik2 > B when i = 0, and it converges towards 0 as i goes
to +1. Therefore, there exists a unique positive i such that equality (5) is
satised. Note that this value depends on all the parameters i = (i1; :::; iK),
i = (i1; :::; iK) and on the true preferences xi = (xi1; :::; xiK).
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier at the optimum by i , under QV, the
optimal response on issue k is therefore:
bxQVik = sign(xik)max
24 1 + ikik
1 +
2i
ik
jxikj ; 1
35
which is expression (2) in the main text.
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6.2 Optimal responses under QV: The "partisan consis-
tency motive"
Consider the partisan consistency motivecase, with the following utility func-
tion:
Vi(bxi) =  1
2
ik
X
k
h
(1  ik) (bxik   xik)2 + ik (bxik   tik)2i :
Under QV technology, the individual now solves the following optimization
program:
maxbxi2[ 1;+1]K L (bxi; i) =  12ikXk
h
(1  ik) (bxik   xik)2 + ik (bxik   tik)2i
+i
"
B  
X
k
bx2ik
#
;
where i is the Lagrange multiplier. First order condition with respect to bxik
now yields:
bxQVik = ikik + 2i (1  ik)xik + iktik = ikik + 2i bxLik:
If
P
k
 bxLik2  B: responses are the same as under Likert (the budget
constraint is not binding).
If
P
k
 bxLik2 > B, then satisfying the budget constraint implies that:
X
k

ik
ik + 2i
bxLik2 = B: (6)
Note that the left-hand side of the equality is strictly decreasing in i, taking the
value
P
k
 bxLik2 strictly higher than B when i = 0, and converging towards 0
as i goes to +1. Therefore, there exists a unique positive i such that equality
(6) is satised.
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier at the optimum by i , the optimal re-
sponse on issue k under QV is therefore:
bxQVik = 1
1 + 2
i
ik
bxLik;
which is expression (4) in the main text.
13
Figure 1: Moral attitudes, Democrats
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Figure 2: Moral attitudes, Republicans
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Figure 3: Moral attitudes (standard deviation), Democrats
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Figure 4: Moral attitudes (standard deviation), Republicans
17
Figure 5: Economic attitudes, Democrats
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Figure 6: Economic attitudes, Republicans
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Figure 7: Economic attitudes (standard deviation), Democrats
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Figure 8: Economic attitudes (standard deviation), Republicans
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